Louisiana's Mixed
Legal System ROBERT A. PASCAL* RESUME ABSTRACT L 'auteur analyse Vexpérience louisianaise. Il s e n sert pour m ontrer que la codification du droit, préconisée p a r le professeur Tancelin, implique le respect du droit en tant que science et art de Vordre en vue du bien commun. Ce respect décroît dès lors qu'on fa it abstraction des bases ontologiques de la collectivité humaine et q u 'on considère la société comme une simple association d 'individus aux intérêts égoïstes.
The author analyses the Louisiana experience as a basis fo r suggesting that the codified law m ethodology which Professor Tancelin fa vo rs presupposes a respect fo r law as the science and art o f order fo r the com m on good, a respect that decreases as men ignore the ontological bases o f human com m unity and regard society as an association o f individuals fo r selfish concerns.
E SSEN TIA L HISTORY OF LOUISIANA PRIVATE LAW
Louisiana is in its third juridical period. In the first, com pleted in 1769, the order was French and the Custom o f Paris and various edicts and ordinances o f the king were the basis of the private law . 1 In the second, from 1769 to 1803, Spanish law (then uncodified) was in force.2 The third period, the A m erican, began in 1803.3 The Territory of Orleans, roughly the area o f the present State of Louisiana, was carved out of the vast Louisiana Territory in 18044 and becam e the State of Louisiana in 1812.5 W ith United States dom ination L ouisiana's public law becam e A m erican, but its private law rem ained Spanish.6 The Congress of the United States, though it possessed legislative authority to do so until 1812,7 never im posed the com m on law on Louisiana; and since 1812 the Lousiana Constitution has contained a provision rendering im possible the legislative adoption o f unw ritten law . 8 The preservation of the Spanish derecho civil (private substan tive non-com m ercial law, hereinafter referred to as " civil law " ) was accom plished through the draft of A D igest o f the Civil L aw (s) now in fo rc e in the Territory o f Orleans, prom ulgated in 1808.9 This D igest, in the form o f a civil code, was prom ulgated as law, but it was not given the effect o f repealing the Spanish civil law not incom patible with its provisions. 10 A fter the D igest, then, it yet was necessary to consult the ancient laws to discover the rules of order in their fullness. 11 26 March, 1804, c. 38, sec. 11, 2 U.S. Stat. 283 , and o f 3 March 1805, c. 31, sec. 9, 2 U.S. Stat. 331, confirmed the " civil laws" in force except in minor detail. 7. U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3, gives the Congress legislative jurisdiction over territories and possessions of the United States. When the Orleans Territory became the State of Louisiana in 1812, Congress ceased to have legislative jurisdiction over Lousiana's private law.
8. The earliest provision was that of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812, Art. IV, Sec. 11. The provision now in force is that of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. Ill, Sec. 15(B): kkA bill enacting, amending, or reviving a law shall set forth completely the provisions of the law enacted, amended, or revived. No system or code of laws shall be adopted by general reference to it." 9. Orleans Territory, Act o f March 31, 1808. The title page of the Digest uses " A Digest of the Civil Laws" ; the title used at the beginning of the text of the Digest is " A Digest of the Civil Law" . 10. Idem., note 9, sec. 2: " Whatever in the ancient civil laws of this territory, or in the territorial statute, is contrary to the dispositions contained in the said digest, or irreconcilable with them is hereby abrogated." 11. The most cited decision upholding the ancient laws not incompatible with the Digest of 1808 is Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Martin (O.S.) 93 (La. 1817). to m inim ize this inconvenience, a great num ber of " additions and am end m ents" to the D ig e st12 were adopted in 1824 to take effect one month after printing, which was in 1 8 2 5 .13 The w hole, the D igest and the addi tions and am endm ents, was known as the Civil Code o f 1825. Even this Code, how ever, replaced the Spanish civil law for only those matters on which the Code had provided specially or particularly. 14 It was not until 1828 that the pre-A m erican-era R om anist laws yet in force in 1825 were repealed. 15 The Civil Code o f 1825 was brought up to date in 1870 and nam ed the R evised C ivil Code o f 1 8 7 0 .16 This is the civil code now in force. It was am ended relatively little before I960. Since that date it has been am ended frequently, and presently the Louisiana State Law Institute is preparing a com plete revision of it. 17 It is because of this Civil C ode, fundam entally S p an ish18 with some other influences, largely French in 1825 and the years im m ediately following that date, 19 and more recently 12. These " Additions and Amendments" , published in 1823, are more commonly known as the " Projet of the Civil Code of 1825" . They were republished in (1937) 18. There is much opinion that, to the contrary, the Digest of 1808 replaced Loui siana's Spanish law with French law except in certain particulars, and that accordingly the Civil Codes o f 1825 and 1870 also are predominantly French in character. This matter is discussed further in that portion of the text to which footnotes 56-58 are appended.
19. Perhaps the principal changes in the Civil Code of 1825 from Spanish to French thought were the adoption of the principle of le mort saisit le vif in succession matters, an increase in the amount of the disposable portion, and the extension of the effects of putative marriage to instances in which one spouse only was in good faith. Four years A nglo-A m erican, that Louisiana can be said to have a " m ixed" or a " bileg al" system .
FO R M A L SOURCES OF LO U ISIANA CIVIL LAW
A ccording to the Louisiana Civil Code, the formal sources of positive law are two: legislation and custom . 20 If there is neither legislation nor custom applicable to a situation, the judge is to decide according to " eq u ity " , defined in the Civil Code itself as a recourse to the natural law (French text: loi naturelle), reason (raison), i.e ., droit nature I, or usages received in the silence o f legislation and custom . 21 Louisiana's juridical order (droit, derecho, ju s), therefore, is not limited to positive elem ents. It includes a legislated recognition of philosophical sources, though not o f theological sources as in the Spanish era . 22 The recognized custom s are fe w . 23 Judicial precedents do not have juridically authorized force,24 but in practice they usually are followed unless dem onstrated to be in error or inappropriate.
later La. Acts 1828, No. 36, abolished the curatorship of puberes and extended tutorship to the age of majority. In the same period, however, the Civil Code o f 1825 itself introduced " joint obligations" resembling the Spanish and La. Acts 1829, No. 17, and reintroduced the Roman-Spanish institution of venia aetatis, thus manifesting there was no tendency simply to imitate French law. Indeed, the Civil Code o f 1825 itself had introduced rules of offer and acceptance inspired by the Prussian Landrecht and changed the rules on the vicarious responsibility of parents, tutors, teachers, and employers to conform more closely to Germanic notions. On these last two points see the present articles 1797-1810 and 2317-2320. 20. La. Civil Code (1870), Preliminary Title, Chapter 1, now entitled simply " Of Law" , but entitled " Of Law and Customs" in both the French and the English texts of the Digest of 1808 and in the French text of the Civil Code o f 1825, contains two articles defining " law" and describing how customs arise. In this context the reference to " law" undoubtedly is to legislation, and not to all rules of the legal order. 21. La. Civil Code, art. 21: " In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law (Fr.: loi naturelle) and reason (Fr.: raison), or received usages, where positive law is silent (ou aux usages reçus, dans le silence de la loi primitive). The construction given to this article in the main text was argued in another article by the author, " The Sources of Civil Order According to the Louisiana Civil Code," (1980) 54 Tulane Law Review 916.
22. Las Siete Partidas (1348), Part. I, Title 1, Law 6, declares that the laws in that book are based on two repositories of wisdom, the words of the saints relative to the spiritual good and those of wise men relative to worldly acts.
23. Perhaps there is only one judicially recognized custom, that of permitting the married woman and the divorced woman to use the surname of her husband or exhusband. See Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, writ denied 343 So. 2d 1077 (1977) . Other customs do exist, but these, founded on the popular acceptance of judicial constructions or interpretations of legislation, usually are thought of simply as prevailing judicial constructions. See footnote 42, below, and the text to which it is appended.
24. No legislation sanctions precedents. On the contrary, the limitation of the formal
The civil law has its principal expression in the Civil Code, but there is m uch legislation of civil law character in the com pilation known as the R evised S tatutes. 25 The bulk of this legislation is com patible with the C ivil Code, but there is som e, of A nglo-Am erican orientation, that is not. The m ajor exam ple is the Trust Code of 1964,26 the texts of which reflect the traditional A nglo-A m erican division between " com m on law " and " eq u ity" , 27 and im port powers of disposition28 and restraints on alienation29 not recognized in basic Louisiana civil law.
The legislation on com m ercial law " specialties" , also in the Revised Statutes, is of Anglo-A m erican type. Included are seven of the nine " articles" (titles) of the Uniform Commercial C ode30 that has been adopted in near entirety in every other state of the Union. In principle, the civil law m ust be considered to apply to com m ercial law matters for which there is no legislated base. This is so because, as m entioned above, 31 there is no unw ritten A nglo-A m erican com m on law in force in Louisiana, only those aspects of it adopted in the form of particular legislation.
TH E O R G A N IZA TIO N A L PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA PRIV A TE LAW
The states of the Union are not divisions of the nation with delegated com petences. On the contrary, each state enjoys a sovereign jurisdiction over all matters except those for which a special com petence sources of law to legislation and custom necessarily excludes precedent as a formal source. See footnote 20, above. That this was the intent of the redactors of the additions and amendments to the Digest of 1808 is clear from their report to the Louisiana legislature dated February 13, 1823, and reprinted in 1 Louisiana Legal Archives LXXXVI-XCV, particularly that passage at pp. XCI-XCIII.
25. La. Revised Statutes (1950) as amended. Unfortunately the only current edition is that of the West Publishing Company, a portion of West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated, containing so many annotations and other items as to require at least forty-two main volumes, seven more bound volumes of tables, indices, and supplements, plus pocket parts.
26. La. Acts 1964, No. 338, as amended, La. Revised Statutes 9:1721 et seq. (1964) . 27. La. Revised Statutes 9:1731 (1964) defines a trust as " the relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit of another."
28. The reference is to various substitutions, otherwise forbidden, but permitted in trusts: in class dispositions, La. Revised Statutes 9:1891-1895 (1964 as amended); between interest beneficiary and principal beneficiary, idem., 9:1965; and in the event a principal beneficiary dies intestate and without descendants, idem., 9:1972-1978. 29. The spendthrift trust provisions are La. Revised Statutes 9: 2001-2007 (1964) . 30. La. Revised Statutes 10:1-101 through 8-501 (1974) . This legislation consists essentially of Articles (titles) 1, 3-8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1952; revised generally 1972; Articles 9 and 8 revised in 1972 and 1977) . Louisiana has not adopted Article 2 (Sales) or Article 9 (Secured Transactions).
31. See text supported by footnotes 7 and 8, above.
is given to the federal governm ent by the United States C onstitution.32
The im portance of this for the private law is that, in principle, every state determ ines for itself what will be its private law. Instances of particular federal private law legislation applicable in all the states, because of grants of legislative jurisdiction to the federal governm ent under Article 1, Section 8 o f the United States C onstitution, often construed broadly, are the laws on brankruptcy, m aritim e m atters, and various particular subjects to the extent they are connected with interstate or foreign com m erce, nota bly labor, com m unications, and securities regulation. In principle, civil law exclusively in the jurisdiction of the states will not be affected by federal legislation, but som etim es it will be superseded indirectly. An exam ple of the latter is the displacem ent of the Louisiana civil law by the federal laws and regulations defining the patrim onial interests of holders of some federal pensions. 33 In general, these displacem ents have been rare. Each state has its own judiciary and the construction and inter pretation of state law is the province of the state courts. State court deci sions are review able by the United States Supreme Court in instances in which one o f the litigants claim s that the judgm ent, or the law on which it is based, is in violation of the C onstitution, laws, or treaties of the United S tates.34 It is true also that federal courts do construe and interpret state laws involved in proceedings otherw ise properly before them , but in these instances they usually adhere to the constructions and interpretations that have been, or should be, made by the courts of the state.35 In general, therefore, the Louisiana courts determ ine the construction and interpre tation of state laws.
Louisiana State courts are organized much in the m anner of A nglo-A m erican courts. The judges are elected, and one of the qualifi cations for election is service at the bar for a num ber of years. 36 Perhaps because they are elected, the judges tend to be regarded popularly som e what as representatives of the people, and not simply as interpreters and appliers of the law. A nglo-A m erican com m on law pleading was never in use in Louisiana. In the year following the establishm ent of the Territory of O rle ans, the territorial Legislature prom ulgated a very simple civil procedure in which the judge was obliged to apply the law to the alleged and proven facts. 37 It was not necessary for the litigant to formulate the legal issues. This was " fact pleading" rather than the " issue pleading" under the forms of action at com m on law in use in the other states at the time. The The Civil Code does not enjoy a special legal position among legislative acts, but it may be said to represent the ju s commune of the state. In civil law and com m ercial law situations in which there is no other legislation to be applied or extended, the Civil Code applies. Though prec edents have no legal authority, the acceptance of the rule of a decision by the people should be recognized as creative of a custom .41 The Louisiana Suprem e C ourt, nevertheless, has been known to reverse a decision whose rule, in the w riter's opinion, had been accepted as custom . 42 Even though precedents have no obligatory force, the Courts of Appeal and the Suprem e Court dem and that inferior courts follow their decisions.43 The Suprem e C ourt is not obliged to follow even its own settled jurisprudence and reversals o f decisions do occur.
Precedents, nevertheless, generally are adhered to in practice. There is no doubt that ordinarily both advocates and judges prefer to be guided by judicial rather than doctrinal opinions. Often practitioners search for solutions first in the decisions and take the research no further if the results satisfy their purposes.
C O N STR U C TIO N AND INTERPRETATIO N OF LO U ISIA N A PRIV A TE LAW
Inasm uch as the Anglo-Am erican com m on law is not in force in Louisiana, it is im possible to treat our legislation, whether civil or com m ercial, as in derogation of it. The com m on law as such does not exist in Louisiana. Nor is there a Rom anist ju s com mune with force of law against w hich the Civil Code or other legislation must be construed. All the R om anist laws in force in L ouisiana's Spanish days and in force in 1825 were repealed in 1828.44 Accordingly, the practice of citing the R om anist laws decreased dram atically after 1828. But it did not cease com pletely.45 In 1839, Justice François Xavier M artin, one of the first three justices o f the Louisiana Suprem e Court, rem arked that it was the habit o f Louisiana attorneys and judges to make these consultations. In the same opinion Justice M artin decided that the Legislature did not even 42. In Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 856, 157 So. 121 (1934) have the com petence to repeal the form er " civil law s" in their entirety, but only to repeal those positing new rules, and not those merely repeating principles and rules already discovered by courts of justice in cases not founded on purely positive legislation.46 He was affirm ing, in other words, that whereas legislation is only posited or man m ade, and therefore alter able by m an, the juridical order (droit, derecho, ju s) discovered by the judiciary is ontological, and therefore unalterable in principle. The practice of consulting the form er R om anist laws continues, but the instances are less frequent now that judicial precedents are so num erous.47
Shortly after Justice M artin's era, however, the bench and bar began to consult com m entaries on the French Code Civil to obtain enlight enm ent about the m eaning and application of our own. To understand how and why this practice developed, one m ust rem em ber that familiarity with the Spanish language was decreasing, the Spanish law had not yet been codified in a m odern way, that taking place in 1888, and accordingly Spanish works com parable to the French com m entaries had not yet becom e available. At the sam e time many in the population still knew French well, the French com m entaries were m arvels of simplicity and clarity, the texts of the Louisiana C ivil Code often were identical or sim ilar to those of the French Code C ivil, and happily, the diffuse and different com m on law legal m aterials had not becom e readily available through efficient indices and encyclopedias. The practice waned in the first part of the twentieth century, to be revived during the period of renewed interest in R om anist 46. Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839) , at 198: " The repeal spoken of in the code, and the act of 1828, cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted; for it is this alone which it may repeal; eodem modo quiquid constitutur, eodem modo dissolvitur. The civil or municipal law . . . is necessarily confined to positive or written law. It cannot be extended to those unwritten laws which do not derive their authority from the positive institution of any people, as the revealed law, the natural law, the law of nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws which are founded in those relations of justice that existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any positive precept. We, therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and French civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are the positive, written, or statute laws of those nations, and of this state; and only such as were introductory of a new rule, and not those which were merely declaratory -that the legislature did not intend to abrogate those principles of law which had been established or settled by the decisions of courts of justice law that attained m om entum in the 1930s and after W orld W ar II, of which more will be said later in this paper. M uch of this use of French doctrinal m aterial was helpful, but som etim es it proved disastrous, the bench and bar ignoring the subtle, and som etimes the obvious, differences between the Louisiana C ivil Code and the French Code C ivil.48 The proper use of French doctrinal m aterials as aids to understanding our civil law even now is not well understood.
The legislation o f A nglo-Am erican type pertaining to civil or com m ercial m atters often is construed in the context of the com m on law, even though the latter is not a formal source of law, in order to give it the same sense it would have in the Anglo-Am erican states. If, however, it m ust be said that the legislated com m on law rule does not fit the facts at hand, it is the C ivil Code as general law or ju s commune that applies. This practice has been confirm ed legislatively for com m ercial matters not provided for by that portion of the Uniform Commercial Code enacted into law in L ouisiana.49
There are, nevertheless, areas in which the com mon law has served as a source o f ideas for the more particular specification of Civil Code articles that are so general in content as to be statements of principle rather than of rule. The m ajor exam ple is that of the Civil Code articles on obligations ex delicto and quasi ex delicto. Fault and negligence are not defined in the Civil Code. Our judges, and our advocates as well, perhaps because they were w ithout a sufficient Louisiana doctrinal liter ature to guide them , turned to the com m on law . 50 After all, if fault and 48. Thus it was that in Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952) , the court refused to allow disavowal of paternity by proof of non-cohabitation during a period of voluntary separation, even though art. 188 of the Louisiana Civil Code permitted it, citing, among other reasons, French doctrinal writing that did not mention the ground, the judges not noticing that French doctrine was as it was because the French Code Civil did not contain a similar provision. Similarly, in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975), the court relied on French doctrine even though Louisiana's pertinent legis lation on the marriage contract and on paternal authority quite clearly was of Spanish character.
49. La. Revised Statutes 10:1-103 (1975 Appraised" , (1937) 12 Tulane Law Review 12, it was admitted that the area of delict was the " firmest ground on which Professor Ireland stands" . Yet the Louisiana use of Anglo-American experience in determining fault or negligence is not different from French doctrinal use of Anglo-American experience for the same purpose, and that scarcely renders French doctrine Anglo-American. See, for example, H. Mazeaud and A. Tunc, Responsabilité Civile, 6e éd. 1965, Vol I, Nos. 439, 444. negligence are m atters of fact rather than of law and as such should be judged according to popular notions, then perhaps it was reasonable for our advocates and judges to put them selves in accord with their Anglo-Am erican brethren. W e are Am ericans as well as Louisianians.
But it is to be adm itted that Louisiana advocates and judges have used com m on law notions in the construction and interpretation of the Civil Code even in instances in which the texts were clear and demanded other solutions, sometimes with extensive effects. For example, even though article 2985 defines m andate as a contract in which one person gives another authority to act juridically in his nam e, the Louisiana Supreme Court attributes the direct effects of m andate to an act in the m andatary's own nam e. The reason indicated by the Court is simply that the narrower construction would m ake it im possible to give all the effects of mandate to an act by the m andatary in his own n a m e !51 Here without doubt is a construction designed to bring Louisiana practice into conform ity with undisclosed agency in the common law in spite of the different rule provided by Louisiana legislation. A nother example: Even though article 2320 holds the em ployer liable for the delict of his em ployee only in the case in which the em ployer had the possibility of preventing the em ployee from causing the injury or dam age, a rule consistent with the Rom anist-Germ anic tradi tion, the Suprem e C ourt decided that the text of the article probably was the result o f a copying error in the course of the drafting of the Civil Code and therefore should be construed in the contrary sense. 52 It was another instance o f a construction designed to bring our law into conform ity with the A nglo-A m erican in a m atter in which uniform ity of rule throughout the nation is im portant. Articles 2985 and 2320 remain today as they were at the tim e of those decisions and no one even attempts to have them am ended to conform with the jurisprudence.
It m ust be noted, too, that our judges at times have used Anglo-A m erican com m on law and equity concepts in instances in which they could have found solutions more in conform ity with our law. Thus at one time they used collateral estoppel53 to go beyond the rules on res ju d ica ta , and often they had recourse to quantum m eruit when enrichm ent without 51.
Sentell v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 29 So. 2d 852 (1947) . 52.
Ware v. Barataría & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La. 169, 35 Am. Dec. 189 (1840) , noted the " unfortunate and unadvised departure from the Napoleon Code" , but enforced the rule as written. Later, however, in Hart v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. Co., 1 Rob. 178, 36 Am. Dec. 689 (1841) , the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to apply the rule and instead held the employer liable though its agents could not have prevented the injury. This judicially substituted rule has been applied ever since.
53. The practice of using collateral estoppel in addition to res judicata was rejected finally in Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978) . See Frank L. Maraist, " Civil Procedure" , in (Symposium) " The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977 -78 Term" , (1979 39 Louisiana Law Review 657, at 914. cause would have been m ore consistent with our law . 54 The use of consid eration instead o f cause in contract analysis is yet another exam ple. 55 It should be evident, therefore, that Louisianians have never developed the m ethod o f legislative positivism , which identifies legislation as the unique source of the positive law (except for custom ) and, accord ingly, limits the rules and principles of the positive law to those explicitly or im plicitly in the legislation (or custom ).
A NA LYSIS OF LO U ISIA N A PRIVATE LAW
The fact that Louisiana has a civil code and that its form was inspired by (and often its very words taken from ) the French Code Civil or the P rojet de VAn VIII accounts in large measure for the im pression of m any persons, law professionals as well as non-professionals, in Loui siana and elsewhere, that our civil law is French in rule56 and in philosophy57 N either o f these notions, how ever, is in accord with the historically prob able facts. Far from intending to replace Spanish law with French civil law, the redactors used the French Code Civil and Projet de VAn VIII only as m odels for the plan of the D igest and as collections of already-written texts that reflected, or could be m odified to reflect, the substance of the Spanish civil law . 58 The reasons are not difficult to find.
The Spanish-and French-speaking Louisianians of 1803 to 1828, that form ative period of m odern Louisiana private law, sought to preserve the R om anist law that conform ed so well with both their cultures. The in the New O rleans area, derived from southern France, whose law before codification was closer to the law of Spain than it was to the largely custom ary law o f northern France codified in the Code Civil of 1804. As a political reality, m oreover, there could have been no question of adopting French law after the A m erican dom ination. French law was foreign law. It would have been understandable only to retain the Spanish civil law or to adopt A nglo-A m erican law.
The Spanish law in force, according to its description by the Legislature o f the Territory o f Orleans in 1806,59 consisted of, first, the com pilations o f Justinian illum inated by the com m entaries on them , but only insofar as they had not been derogated from by the Spanish law; and, secondly, o f the Spanish legislation of 1255 to 1803 illum inated by the com m entaries thereon recognized in the courts. Certainly this was not a codified law in the French sense of 1804. Actually it was a law, or legal system , m uch closer in thought and m ethod to the Anglo-Am erican law o f the time. The R om anist-Spanish law certainly contained m uch more legislation than the A nglo-A m erican, but the opinions of the com m entators on the R om an and Spanish legislation occupied a position sim ilar to those o f the judges in A nglo-A m erican law. For the Spanish, m oreover, the juridical order (droit, derecho, j u s ) was ontological, and the legislation only m an-m ade attem pts to discover, specify, and im plement it, as was suggested by Justice M artin in 1839. Legislators, judges, and com m en tators all cooperated, each according to his function, in the effort to discover what could be considered good juridical order (droit, derecho, ju s ) and to specify it as positive legal order. The legislation was only one species o f judgm ent, even if the principal one, on the question of the order proper for a people predom inantly of Spanish and French culture, living under essentially Spanish conditions, and sharing the same philosophy and C ath olic religion.
It should not be astonishing that the D igest of 1808 and the Civil Code o f 1825 incorporated prelim inary titles on law (droit) that viewed the positive legal order as based on " natural law and reason" 60 and the Louisiana jurists availed them selves of a non-positivistic m eth odology in conform ity with the R om anist and Anglo-Am erican juridical traditions represented in the state. N either one nor the other yet had become philosophically positivistic, and even legislative positivism would have 59. The description is given in an act of the Orleans Territorial Legislature, vetoed by Governor W. C. C. Claiborne, apparently because he considered it to state no more than what everyone knew. The original is in the National Archives, U.S. State Dept., Orleans Territorial Papers, Vol. VIII, and it is reprinted in 9 Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States (1940) at 642. 60. The writer's exegesis of the preliminary title of the Louisiana Civil Code appears in his " The Sources of Civil Order According to the Louisiana Civil Code" , (1980) 54 Tulane Law Review 916. seem ed very foreign to m ost creoles and Am ericans in Louisiana. W hatever the reason m ay have been, how ever, the non-acceptance of legislative positivism in the form ative years of our system perm itted our legal profes sionals to rem ain in closer contact with the prim ary experiences of onto logical order for alm ost a century after the repeal of the background Rom anist laws.
One may ask, nevertheless, why the Louisiana Civil Code, so well organized, did not inspire the developm ent of a m ethod for construing and interpreting it that would be closer to that of the French Code Civil, though w ithout adopting its legislative positivism . Two reasons, though not by any m eans the only ones, have been the inadequacy of our legal education for this purpose and the absence of sufficient local doctrine. It was only in 1847 that the first university law school was founded in the state.61 The other three were begun in 1906, 1912, and 1947 . Before W orld W ar II m any aspirants to the profession attended Anglo-Am erican law schools and a num ber simply " read law " under the tutelage of attorneys.62 B eginning in the twenties there arose a new interest in Rom anist law and codification. Precisely at this m om ent, however, the Louisiana law schools sought accreditation from the American Bar Association and the Association of A m erican Law Schools63 and, in order to obtain that accreditation, began to teach even codified law subjects according to the case m ethod, a m ethod that, in fact, though not theoretically, poses an obstacle to the appreciation of a civil code. Through it the studentsthe advocates, judges, legislators, and professors of the future -are given the habit o f organizing their knowledge of the law around factual situations rather than legal concepts. The Civil Code, then, seldom comes to be appreciated in its totality, for its general plan, its principles, and its rules as specifications of its principles.
It should not be astonishing that professors given this kind of form ation have not developed serious doctrine. We do have articles in the review s, but it was not until 1966 and 1969 that there appeared the first volum es o f two works on Louisiana civil law truly deserving of being called treatises: and these were written by professors brought to Louisiana 61. The Law School of Tulane University was begun in 1847, and those of Louisiana State University, Loyola University, and Southern University in 1906 , 1912 , and 1947 . 62. 1965 was the first year in which a degree from an approved law school was required as a condition for admission to the bar.
63. The Tulane University Law School was admitted to the Association of American Law Schools in 1909 and approved by the American Bar Association in 1925; Louisiana State University Law School, in 1924 and 1926; Loyola University (New Orleans) Law School, in 1931 and 1934 . The Southern University Law School, founded in 1947 approved by the American Bar Association in 1953. from other R om anist jurisdictions.64 M ost lengthy works on Louisiana civil law m ight be classed better as law yer's manuals.
One subject that in recent years has attracted the attention of our professors, attorneys, and judges is the role of the judge in the construction and interpretation of law, particularly codified law .65 This was the preoccupation of the late Professor Joseph Dainow, a native of M ontreal, in the last fifteen years of his life. M ore recently, in 1981, another of our professors com ing from another Rom anist jurisdiction published an extensive work on the judicial construction o f legislation in A nglo-A m erican and Rom anists systems that has attracted widespread attention. It is, how ever, a work more in the American realist tradition than in that o f civilian m ethodology. In any event, the fact that Louisiana legal professionals are particularly interested in this subject may indicate the im portance o f the judge in our system. It would be difficult, however, to affirm that this interest in construction and interpretation of legislation is indicative of a w idespread tendency among Louisiana legal profession als, especially those outside the academ ic world, toward a more profound respect for legislation as the basic evidence of our private law . 66 From 1803 until about 1925, or perhaps 1930, Louisiana profes sionals respected the legislation as the prim ary specification of the positive legal order, but also were ready to construe and interpret it in the context o f notions o f objective justice in general acceptance in the Rom anist and A nglo-A m erican legal worlds. As late as 1947 a Louisiana Supreme Court justice declared to the author seriously that he bore the title " ju stic e" because it was his obligation to do justice, and that he would do justice even if it were necessary for him to " tw ist" the law. Some later justices have shared this view and occasionally the Supreme Court itself has rendered opinions that, notw ithstanding the ju stices' subjectively good intentions toward one litigant, worked grave injustice on the other.67 There may be here an explanation as to why Louisiana judges have been able to adopt A nglo-A m erican concepts in the place of, or in supplem ent to, those of the Rom anist law. It is possible to venture the opinion that Louisiana professionals viewed the juridical order as ontological, the legislation merely as necessarily incom plete m easures for its positive specification.
Today, how ever, popular thought -not simply that in lawtends to ignore the possibility o f know ledge of the ontological order, itself the only basis of com m unity among m en, which in turn is the sole basis of m oral obligation. The result is an egocentrism that cannot acknowledge an ontological com m unity and that logically, if not rationally, must limit itself to an association of individuals for ultim ately individualistic ends. Accordingly society, law, convention, and conventional morals reduce them selves to that. In this milieu there is no juridical right order (droit, derecho, ju s), only positive legal norms without moral obligation. A ccord ingly individuals are deem ed to have license to make what use of legal norm s they wish and, in addition, to have the legal " right" or " liberty" to do anything not deem ed part of the positive legal order by legislation or by a com m on law reduced to a historical consensus.68 Under these conditions one may not speak of a m ethod of construction and interpre tation in service of the law. There can be only methods for utilizing the laws pragm atically for ends that are considered to be without ontological basis and therefore ethically uncriticizable.
A m erican law schools, those of Louisiana included, have not escaped this moral degradation. Under the realist m ovem ent of the twenties and later, the law schools, even in Louisiana, began to think of law as only one o f the m any stimuli influencing those hum an actions classified as leg al.69 The law therefore ceased to be the science of order for the com m on good and was reduced to one of the m eans of utilizing public the child enjoyed neither registry nor reputation as his legitimate child, as required by the Civil Code. The most extreme decision was that in Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080 , 262 So. 2d 328 (1972 , in which the Louisiana Supreme Court was willing to consider the child both a legitimate child of the husband of the mother and also the illegitimately conceived child of the mother's paramour with whom she contracted a bigamous marriage before the child's birth. The injustice to the mother's husband in such an instance is inexcusable.
68. The United States Supreme Court seems to have expressed this view in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) , the famous abortion decision. The reasoning appears to the author to have been as follows: (1) The justices will not act as philosophers or theologians;
(2) There is no historical consensus (common law?) in the United States or England that abortion should be forbidden in the interest of the child; (3) American legislation restricting abortions, until that attacked in the suit, was enacted solely in the interest of protecting the mother's health and life; (4) therefore a woman has a right (described as one of " privacy" , part of a sphere of activity not yet restricted by consensus to the contrary) to abort her child.
69. Perhaps the most explicit work was that of one-time professor and then judge Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) . The influence of John Dewey's concept of man, as evidenced in his Human Nature and Conduct (1930) , also was considerable. force to attain particular en d s.70 Instruction in law became more and more without plan as to the substance o f the law. Students were allowed to elect the courses they wished because the substance of the legal order no longer was im portant, only the pragm atic artifice of legislator, advocate, or ju d g e .71 Law schools have not yet liberated themselves from this perni cious thought,72 one that has com e to infect today's scholarship not only in law , but also in history, political science, and literature under the label of instrum entalism .
The future is difficult to predict. Respect for law as the science and art o f order for the com m on good in society is not likely to be regained w ithout an intellectual and spiritual revival that will bring about an acknow ledgm ent o f the ontological com m unity of m ankind and its im pli cations. Unless and until that occurs, law schools will not be better than they are, law will be used rather than applied, and m ethodology for the purpose o f giving the law effect will not be taken seriously.
70. Of considerable influence, particularly through graduate students in law who then became faculty members, and sometimes judges, was that of the Yale Law School, notably through the efforts of Professor Myers McDougal. See especially M. McDougal, " The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community" , (1946) 56 Yale Law Review 1345, wherein he advocated the utilization of authoritative legal materials in order to achieve objectives of a " policy science" , thus subverting law as the plan of order for society and elevating " policy science" in its place. Many influential Louisiana law professors and some judges have been exposed to Yale graduate studies. 71. A reading of that section of the Introduction to the Association of American Law Schools' 69170 Pre-Law Handbook describing law studies (pp. 18-25), for example, concerns itself almost entirely with lawyers' skills, saying little if anything about the nature of law, its purpose, or its principles, except to note that each student should answer questions about these matters for himself.
72. Long after this sentence was written, there appeared in the Wall Street Journal of March 5, 1984, an article by Scott M. Freeman, the executive director of the Penn sylvania Law Review, complaining that even a student editor of that review believes that action in violation of law is justified for ends deemed worthwhile by the actor, and conclud ing that " the rule of law may be threatened in this country" .
The author recently had a similar personal experience. A colleague from another faculty, on being asked why he used what he certainly knew to be a misconstruction of an article of the Louisiana Civil Code as a premise for an argument, replied that one should not be concerned with the truth of his premises, but only with the merit of that for which he was making the argument.
